

Committee: Historical Security Council (Year: 1969)

Issue: The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict

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PERSONAL INTRODUCTION

Dear esteemed delegates,

My name is Louai and I am 15 years old. This will be my second time chairing and I am very excited to meet every single one of you. I am absolutely delighted to be serving as one of the co-chairs in the Historical Security Council.

Even though MUN is an extracurricular activity in which you have to devote your time and efforts, it is a key stepping stone to a bright future. In this committee, you will be intrigued to keep up with global affairs without being bored, representing your delegation at a 'global' level whilst feeling a sense of power, control and jubilation.

Most importantly, you will have the opportunity to interact with people from different backgrounds, make alliances and come up with diverse and effective solutions manifesting a fruitful conference.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions on the topic at

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Best of Luck,

Louai EL-Hajj

TOPIC INTRODUCTION

Strains at long last reached a crucial stage in March 1969, along the Ussuri River, the ineffectively differentiated line between the USSR and Northeast China.

The Sino-Soviet boundary conflict gives significant exact proof to reevaluating hypotheses of atomic discouragement and emergency conduct created during the

Cold War, and offers new experiences and exercises for current and future atomic difficulties.

By far most of what we know – or possibly what we think we know – about atomic discouragement depends generally on the U.S.- Soviet experience during the Cold War. While this rich history stays significant and important for some current and future atomic circumstances, it ought not fill in as the lone exact establishment for creating U.S. strategies.

Given the scope of current and arising atomic dangers, the previous encounters and practices of minor atomic forces, and the communications among major and minor atomic states, are probably going to be particularly valuable and educational for U.S. leaders in planning and actualizing believable and successful atomic arrangements.

In this unique situation, the Sino-Soviet line contest reveals new insight into the conduct of new atomic forces; the conduct of major atomic forces toward new atomic states; the elements of emergencies in incomprehensibly unbalanced atomic connections; and the part of vital culture in discouragement and emergency conduct. Likewise, the line strife is the principal case – and one of just two cases – of atomic furnished states taking part in direct regular clash.

Thusly, this case is a significant trial of the "steadiness flimsiness mystery," which thinks about whether common atomic belonging may energize, or if nothing else grant, hostility beneath the atomic limit in the conviction that neither one of the sides would heighten.

All the more comprehensively, this case addresses a long-running discussion among global relations researchers about the effect of atomic expansion on worldwide security and strength. On one side of this "hopefulness cynicism banter," as it is called, are the individuals who contend that the further spread of atomic weapons will improve security and decline the probability of war (both atomic and traditional) by altogether raising the dangers and possible expenses of any type of contention between atomic furnished states.

On the opposite side are the individuals who battle that more expansion would be perilous and destabilizing in light of the fact that it would improve the probability of atomic use unintentionally, erroneous conclusion, or purposeful decision.

Thus, an assessment of the Sino Soviet line conflict utilizing accessible Chinese and Russian sources will give new bits of knowledge and exercises that can be utilized to advise U.S. atomic arrangements and discouragement systems, just as apply new proof as a powerful influence for more extensive hypothetical discussions.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Border Conflict

“A dispute about who controls a particular territory occurring between two or more territories that have land borders and one of which claims to have land in the other’s territory.”¹

Revisionist

“A person wanting to change a political system, especially Marxism, because you do not agree with its main ideas and practices.”²

Marxist

“A person who follows the political and economic theories of Karl Marx, which states that individuals on the planet are coordinated into various gatherings, or classes, in light of how they help work. The vast majority are classified "laborers" since they work in production lines, workplaces, or ranches for cash. They have a place with the ‘working people’.”³

Argun River

“The Argun River is a 1,620-kilometer-long waterway that structures part of the eastern China–Russia line. The Argun denotes the border line among Russia and China for around 944 kilometers, until it meets the Amur River. The Argun River from the



¹ “Border Dispute Definition and Meaning: Collins English Dictionary.” Border Dispute Definition and Meaning | Collins English Dictionary, HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/border-dispute.

² “Revisionist.” revisionist_1 Adjective - Definition, Pictures, Pronunciation and Usage Notes | Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.com, www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/revisionist_1?q=revisionist%2B

³ “Marxist.” marxist_1 Noun - Definition, Pictures, Pronunciation and Usage Notes | Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.com, www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/marxist_1?q=Marxist

three-sided intersection with Mongolia toward the north tip of China, running southwest to upper east.”⁴

Ussuri River

“The Ussuri River was divided in a nonconventional way so the outline line ran along the right (Chinese) side of the waterway, putting the actual stream with every one of its islands in Russia.”⁵

Amur River

“The Amur, or Heilong Jiang, is the world's tenth longest river, forming the border between the Russian Far East and Northeastern China. More specifically, the Amur River to Khabarovsk from northwest to southeast, where it was joined by Ussuri River running south to north.”⁶

Zhenbao Island

“Zhenbao Island or Damansky Island is an island with a region of just 0.74 square kilometers. It is on the Ussuri River on the boundary between Primorsky Krai, Russia, and Heilongjiang Province, the island is important for Russia.”⁷

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

On 2 March 1969, Chinese soldiers trapped and murdered a gathering of Soviet boundary monitors on Zhenbao Island, one of the many questioned islands on the Ussuri River.

As Sino-Soviet pressures uplifted during the 1960s, responsibility for minuscule, uninhabited, and deliberately negligible waterway islands along the Ussuri, which was



⁴ “Argun River.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/place/Argun-River

⁵ “Ussuri River.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/place/Ussuri-River.

⁶ “Amur River.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/place/Amur-River.

⁷ Goldstein, Lyle J. “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters.” *The China Quarterly*, no. 168, 2001, pp. 985–997. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3657368.

assigned among China and the Soviet Union by the 1860 Treaty of Peking, turned into an issue of dispute.

As per Beijing, responsibility for waterway islands were symbolic of more extensive Russian endeavors, going back many years, to extend its domain by constraining a feeble China to sign "inconsistent" arrangements that passed on huge sections of Chinese region to tsarist Russia. The Soviet Union, in any case, contended that China had no lawful case to the stream islands.

⁸As indicated by Moscow, the Treaty of Peking unmistakably distinguished the limit line among China and the Soviet Union here as running along the Chinese riverbank. For China, the assault on Zhenbao was intended to hinder future Soviet incitements. The sharp decline in Sino-Soviet relations, a huge Soviet military development in the boundary district, and the Soviet attack of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and resulting declaration of the Brezhnev Doctrine⁹. This declaration was a Soviet international strategy that broadcasted any danger to communist guideline in any condition of the Soviet alliance in Central and Eastern Europe and in this way supported the mediation of individual communist states.

By starting a restricted assault, China looked to exhibit that it couldn't be harassed, and that a potential Soviet assault would be stood up to.

The Soviets, nonetheless, got an altogether different message from the assault.

Though Mao planned to hinder future Soviet animosity, Moscow deciphered China's activities as forceful and symbolic of an undeniably revisionist and opposing system in Beijing.

On 15 March, China and the Soviet Union battled again on Zhenbao, this time with a lot bigger powers and capability. Apparently, Russia started this contention in reprisal for the Chinese attack fourteen days sooner.

Before very long, Moscow and Beijing faced a few additional conflicts along the line, bringing about an as yet unclear number of setbacks. Following the contentions on Zhenbao, Moscow embraced a coercive discretion technique toward Beijing. A few times in the months following the gore on Zhenbao, the Soviet Union intentionally indicated that it may utilize atomic weapons, particularly in a careful strike on China's early atomic offices.

⁸"Sino-Soviet Border Conflict." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 13 Feb. 2021, www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_border_conflict.

⁹ "Brezhnev Doctrine." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/event/Brezhnev-Doctrine.

Though China excused Moscow's underlying atomic dangers and didn't react to early proposition for arrangements, Beijing's view of the validity of Soviet atomic dangers changed drastically in the late spring of 1969.

On 27 August, CIA Director Richard Helms told the press that Moscow had been moving toward unfamiliar governments such as Hungary to ask about their responses to a potential Soviet preemptive strike on China.

For Beijing, the information that Moscow had moved toward different nations enormously expanded the validity of Soviet atomic dangers. In the event that the United States paid attention to Soviet tests enough to disclose them, Beijing probably contemplated; at that point there should be a genuine and quick chance of an assault.

At the point when Moscow again proposed exchanges half a month later, Beijing concurred. The Soviets utilized atomic dangers to adequately propel China to the arranging table. Beijing's inevitable view of the validity of Soviet atomic dangers had unintended results that significantly expanded the chance of unplanned or coincidental atomic heightening. Feelings, stress, and doubt of Soviet goals grabbed hold in China, especially for Mao Zedong and Lin Biao.

The Chinese administration started to stress, but dependent on minimal solid proof, that Moscow would utilize the boundary dealings as a "distraction" for an atomic "sneak assault."

As of late 1969, China had gotten so worried about a Soviet atomic strike that the focal administration, including Mao Zedong, fled Beijing, and on 18 October China put its simple atomic powers on full ready – the solitary time this request has been given.

As of the council's session, it is believed that a nuclear attack by USSR against China after its defeat on the Zhenbao Islands is likely. They are not willing to make an agreement concerning the border dispute or make the appropriate adjustments to the Treaty of Peking (1860), whereas a senior Soviet military officer named Nikolai Ogarkov, claimed that a massive nuclear attack "would inevitably mean world war". Additionally, China has recognised USSR's power and threat, however, Mao strongly believes that weapons are not the decisive factor to any problem, it is the people, not the things that are decisive, and hence they are adopting an asymmetric deterrence strategy¹⁰.

The key objectives that the delegates have to tackle is how to ease tension between China and the USSR, as they are both ready to manifest a nuclear war, reevaluate the Treaty of Peking due to the fact that China claims it is "unequal" and last but not least what techniques should be utilized in order to the exact location of the boundary line

¹⁰ Zagare, Frank C., and D. Marc Kilgour. "Asymmetric Deterrence." *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 1, 1993, pp. 1–27. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2600829.

between Russia and China. Even though, both agreed that the treaty listed the Amur and Ussuri rivers as the border, there is a sharp divergence in interpretation as to what this meant regarding ownership of the hundreds of river islands.

MAJOR COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

The Soviets wanted and had already effectively controlled almost every island along the three rivers (Argun River, Ussuri River and Amur River) that demarcated the border.

People's Republic of China (PRC)

China claimed the three islands (Argun River, Ussuri River and Amur River) that had demarcated the border, as they were on the Chinese side of the river if they were demarcated according to international law by using shipping lanes.

United States of America (USA)

USA wanted to form relations with China so as for them to become allies however China was more intrigued by the chance of a rapprochement with the United States as a method of reacquiring Taiwan than in having the United States as a partner against the Soviet Union.

India

On 5 May 1969, Kosygin ventured out to India, which was unequivocally against China since it had won the 1962 battle, to talk about a Soviet-Indian union against China, with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Date	Description of event
December 27, 1967	East German Report on First Interknit Meeting in Moscow
March 1, 1969	Polish-Soviet Talks in Moscow Gomulka and Brezhnev discuss Sino-Soviet border skirmishes. Brezhnev guarantees the Chinese are getting ready for their Congress and attempting to "cement the moods of enmity toward the USSR."

	They likewise talk about the chance of improved Sino-American ties.
April 2, 1969	Telegram to East German Foreign Ministry from Ambassador to China
April 28, 1969	Embassy of the GDR in the PRC, 'Note about a "Club Talk" of the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors of the fraternal countries on 25 April 1969 in the Embassy of the GDR' Ambassadors to China from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Mongolia discuss Chinese border provocations, the ninth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and other aspects of Chinese domestic and foreign policy.
May 19, 1969	Cable from the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, 'Responses in the DRV to the work and results of the "9th CPC Congress"' An analysis from the Soviet Embassy in the DRV of the response in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the 9th Chinese Communist Party Congress. The DRV is accounted for to be disappointed with the absence of consideration and aloofness, the CPC Congress paid to Vietnam.
June 10, 1969	Government office of the GDR in the PR China, 'On 2 June 1969, note about a Conversation of the Ambassador of the GDR in the PR China, Comrade Hertzfeldt, with the Head of Main Department in the Foreign Ministry of the PR China, Yu Zhan' A report on the GDR's unfamiliar relations with nations like Cambodia, Iraq, and Sudan, just as with West Germany.
August 23, 1969	Telegram from Aurel Duma to Corneliu Manescu Concerning the Conversation with Zhou Enlai Telegram from Aurel Duma specifying his gathering with Chinese head Zhou Enlai. Enlai comments that China trusts Soviet residents to be discontent with the counter China position taken by the USSR. He additionally talks about Soviet intercessions in Chinese domain, explicitly Xinjiang.

RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, TREATIES AND EVENTS

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance

Under the historical circumstances of the time, the "The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded between China and the Soviet Union was of great significance in preserving the security of both sides, maintaining peace in the Far East and the world as a whole, strengthening friendship between the two peoples and promoting the cause of socialist construction of the two countries."¹¹

Convention of Peking

The Convention or First Convention of Peking is an agreement comprising three distinct treaties concluded between the Qing dynasty of China and Great Britain, France, and Russian Empire in 1860. The convention states that, the eastern boundary among Russia and China was set up from the intersection of the Shilka and Argun Rivers downstream the Amur River to where it streams into the Ussuri River. Grounds lying on the left bank (toward the north) of the Amur, were proclaimed Russian ones; and on the correct bank (toward the south) – Chinese ones. Furthermore, the limit was set along the streams of Ussuri and Sungacha, the Lake Hanka, the waterway Belenhe (Tour) and afterward along the edge to the mouth of the stream Hubitu (Hubtu, Ushagou) and from this spot "through the mountains that lie between the stream Hunchun and along the ocean up to the waterway Tumen." And the terrains deceiving the east of this line, were announced the area of Russia, and towards the west – that of China. The arrangement was going with a guide of the eastern segment of the Russian-Chinese line. In this manner, Russia at long last got the Ussuri district for itself.¹²

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE

On 21 March 1969, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin attempted to telephone Mao with the point of talking about a truce. The Chinese administrator who accepted Kosygin's consider rather impolitely considered him a "revisionist component" and hung up. Zhou, who needed to take up Kosygin's truce offer, was stunned by what he viewed as Mao's wildness: "The two nations are at war, one can't slash the courier." Diplomats from the Soviet consulate in Beijing spent a lot of 22 March in pointlessly attempting

¹¹ Conclusion of the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance", www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18011.shtml#:~:text=Under%20the%20historical%20circumstances%20of,as%20a%20whole%2C%20strengthening%20friendship

¹² "The Convention of Peking of 1860 Is Concluded." *Presidential Library*, 12 Nov. 2018, www.prlib.ru/en/history/619718.

to get hold of Mao's private telephone number so Kosygin could call him to examine harmony.

On 22 March 1969, Mao had a gathering with the four marshals who told the Chinese soldiers in the boundary districts with the Soviet Union to start arrangements for a potential full-scale war. Zhou over and over again asked Mao to talk about a truce however concurred with Mao's refusal to accept calls from Kosygin. With an end goal to assuage Zhou, Mao advised him, "Quickly set up to hold political dealings".

On 17 June 1969, US Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who had for some time been a supporter of normalizing American relations with China, composed a letter in interview with the White House to ask he to permitted to visit China and to meet Mao to talk about measures to improve Sino-American relations. The letter was shipped off King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia with the solicitation to give it to Mao, and by 26 July 1969, Mansfield's letter had shown up in Beijing. The Chinese answer was cruel, with Zhou giving a discourse blaming the US for "animosity" in Vietnam and of "occupation" of Taiwan, which Zhou stated was legitimately a piece of China.

On 1 August 1969, US President Richard Nixon visited Pakistan, a nearby partner of China since both were hostile to Indian, to request that General Yaya Khan pass a message to Mao that he needed to standardize relations with China, particularly in light of the emergency with the Soviet Union.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

International Law

The most central standard of settling regional debates is that they ought to be done as per International law. International law controls relations among states, and any debate between states ought to on a basic level be settled by global law.

Today the utilization of power or the danger of power to tackle worldwide debates is prohibited besides in situations where UN Security Council goals so approve. Regional debates should be settled calmly.

UN Laws

Article 33 of the UN Charter gives that, "the gatherings to any question, the duration of which is probably going to jeopardize the support of worldwide harmony and security, will, most importantly, look for an answer by exchange, enquiry, intercession, appeasement, discretion, legal settlement, resort to territorial organizations or plans, or other serene methods for their own decision." Whichever of these strategies might be utilized, international law is the considerable measures for addressing a debate. It

is consequently significant for a state gathering to introduce lawful contentions which are more effortlessly legitimized and persuading than the other state party considering international law.

Politically settle the border dispute

The USSR and China may consent to set aside their lawful contentions and settle the issue politically. Given the territory being referred to has a place with both of the two nations, it is up to these two nations where to take a stand. In any case, the strength of each state's position gets from their legitimate position, and political conversations can't completely leave from lawful contentions. In this manner, it is critical that state gatherings should get their lawful coherency until a last settlement is accomplished. On the off chance that you recognize the activity of purview by another gathering while asserting your sway, your lawful position will be harmed.

A nuclear “Learning Period”

The Sino-Soviet boundary struggle proposes that there can be a "learning period" for new atomic states. During this period, another atomic state might be uncertain of its atomic abilities, how much prevention or coercive force it gives, and therefore instructions to carry on as an atomic force. Though a few investigators battle that the securing of even a little and unsophisticated atomic ability promptly gives a powerful impediment, this case proposes that a juvenile munitions stockpile combined with an authority unpracticed in atomic issue may not give a similar degree of prevention as a develop munitions stockpile controlled by an accomplished force.

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